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Tax Cannibalization by State Corporate Taxes:
Revised Estimates
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske

Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall) and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors discuss the tax
cannibalization problem and whether it still
applies post Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
In 2016 and 2017, we published a series of
three papers on what we called the “tax
cannibalization” problem. We argued that our
results from this research had profound
implications for numerous debates about fiscal
federalism in the United States — including the
design of federal- and state-level taxes,1 questions
2
about constitutional doctrines, and controversies
3
regarding economic development tax incentives.

1

David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal
Federalism in the United States,” 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 295 (2017).
2

Gamage and Shanske, “The Federal Government’s Power to Restrict
State Taxation,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2016, p. 547.
3

Gamage and Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and State Government
Tax Incentive Programs,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 17, 2016, p. 197.

To briefly summarize some of our key
conclusions, we argued that state-level taxes on
corporate income and on capital gains were
generating large fiscal externalities that deprived
the federal government of revenue. Indeed, we
estimated that these fiscal externalities were so
large that — at the margin — several states’ tax
rates on corporate income and on capital gains
were destroying more than a dollar of federal
revenue per dollar raised for the state
governments.
Yet soon after we published these striking
results, the world of U.S. fiscal federalism
changed rather dramatically. Among the most
4
important of these changes, at the end of 2017
Congress passed the most sweeping federal tax
5
overhaul in more than 30 years. This new
legislation, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, reduced the
federal corporate income tax rate from 35 percent
to 21 percent.
This raises the question: To what extent do our
prior estimates for the tax cannibalization
problem still apply post-2017? In this article we
address that question, focusing on the
implications of the reduced federal corporate

4

Another important change was the Supreme Court’s decision in
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). For some of our
writings on the implications of this decision, in articles we coauthored
with Adam Thimmesch, see “Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign
Vendors,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 8, 2018, p. 111; “Wayfair: Sales Tax
Formalism and Income Tax Nexus,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 3, 2018, p. 975;
and “Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden,” State Tax Notes,
July 30, 2018, p. 447.
5

For a critique of aspects of this tax overhaul that we coauthored with
several other tax scholars, see “The Games They Will Play: Tax Games,
Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation,” 103 Minn. L.
Rev. 1439 (2019).
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6

income tax rate. We otherwise use the exact same
method as in our 2017 article;7 this article departs
from our 2017 calculations only by using the
current corporate income tax rate of 21 percent in
place of the prior rate of 35 percent. In a
forthcoming article, we plan to discuss a further
methodological question related to our use of
statutory corporate income tax rates rather than
effective corporate income tax rates, along with
discussing policy implications of our revised
estimates.
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to
illustrate the essence of how federal-level
corporate income tax rates relate to the tax
cannibalization problem, through a simple
example. Consider this from one of our earlier
8
articles :
The higher a state’s tax rate is on a shared
base, say the corporate income tax base,
the more revenue the federal government
loses from the actions of taxpayers to
avoid paying what is essentially a
combined federal-state tax rate. Put more
concretely, here is a very simple and
simplified example. Suppose a
corporation engages in additional profit
shifting out of the United States because of
the additional 8.84 percent corporate tax
imposed by California. Say the
corporation shields $1 million in
additional profits and California thus
loses $88,400 of tax revenue as a
consequence. The federal fisc potentially
loses $350,000, because the rate at the
federal level is 35 percent. As the example
illustrates, because the federal
government levies much higher taxes on
the shared bases of corporate and
individual income than do any state
governments, the federal government
suffers most of the harm when state-level
tax rates induce taxpayers to engage in

additional distortionary behaviors that
shrink the shared tax base.
How differently would this example play out
today? Again, the key difference is that today’s
federal corporate income tax rate has been
reduced to 21 percent. Thus, if California’s 8.84
percent corporate income tax rate were to induce
a corporate taxpayer to shield an additional $1
million in profits abroad, the federal fisc would
potentially lose $210,000 of revenue as a result of
that additional profit shifting under today’s
federal corporate income tax rate.
As this simplified example suggests, the
magnitude of the tax cannibalization problem
from state corporate income taxes should be
somewhat smaller in 2020, because of the reduced
federal corporate income tax rate. However, the
essential dynamics of the tax cannibalization
problem should remain mostly the same, just with
a smaller magnitude.
Revised Estimates for 2020
In our 2017 article, we explained our method
for estimating the magnitude of the tax
cannibalization problem and then reported
results based on that method. Our bottom-line
results for the magnitude of the avoidable
economic waste from tax cannibalization caused
by state corporate income taxes in 2017 was that
9
— for most states — the marginal dollar raised
through the states’ corporate income taxes (rather
than through an alternative that did not involve
use of a tax base shared with the federal
government, such as state sales taxes)
cannibalized “somewhere between $0.50 and
$0.95 of net revenue” from the combination of the
federal government and other states’
10
governments. As we further explained in that
article, that marginal tax cannibalization
represented economic waste that could have been
prevented by raising marginal revenues through
11
an alternative to state corporate income taxes.

6

Federal capital gains tax rates were essentially left unchanged by the
new legislation. The top federal ordinary income tax rate was reduced
from 39.6 percent to 37 percent, but — in contrast to the reduction in the
federal corporate tax rate — this change does not substantially affect our
prior estimates of tax cannibalization.
7
8

Gamage and Shanske, “Fiscal Federalism,” supra note 1.
Gamage and Shanske, “Tax Incentive Programs,” supra note 3, at

198.
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9

The exceptions were the six states that do not levy corporate income
taxes and Iowa, which levies a 12 percent corporate income tax, higher
than in any other state, but with some unusual base-definition rules that
make the analysis more complicated.
10
11

Gamage and Shanske, “Fiscal Federalism,” supra note 1, at 347.
Id. at 352-53.
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Using the exact same method as described in
our 2017 article, but inputting the 2020 federal
corporate income tax rate of 21 percent, reduces
these estimates so that the marginal dollar raised
through most states’ corporate income tax rates
(rather than through an alternative that would not
involve use of a tax base shared with the federal
government) now generates somewhere between
23 cents and 42 cents of avoidable economic waste
12
from tax cannibalization. In other words, the
magnitude of the tax cannibalization problem
from state corporate income taxes has been
reduced by slightly more than half.
This should not be too surprising. A primary
justification for why Congress slashed the federallevel corporate income tax rate in 2017 was the
widespread view that cross-border tax planning
had made the 35 percent federal rate
unsustainable. Certainly, many tax experts argued
that it would have been better to reform the
corporate tax base to deter this cross-border tax
planning rather than to slash the rate. But this
does not change the reality that, absent
comprehensive reforms to the corporate tax base,
in many experts’ views, the federal-level
corporate income tax rate was set unsustainably
high in 2017. Accordingly, our research found that
the incremental effect of additional state-level
corporate income tax rates was generating
massive amounts of economic waste through tax
cannibalization in 2017.
That this problem has now been more than cut
in half does not mean that the problem is now
small. Avoidable economic waste of 23 cents to 42
cents per marginal dollar raised is still huge
compared to most other policy contexts in which
economic waste could be prevented through
relatively achievable policy changes.

Below is a revised version of “Table 1:
Approximating Tax Cannibalization for
Corporate Income Tax Rates” from our 2017
13
article. Again, the method and inputs are all the
same as in our 2017 article, except that the 2020
federal corporate tax rate of 21 percent is used
instead of the pre-2018 rate of 35 percent.
As in our 2017 article, the vertical axis shows
the semi-elasticity input for vertical distortions
(VD) — that is, the extent to which a state
corporate income tax rate shrinks the combined
federal and state corporate income tax base at the
margin. Similarly, the horizontal axis shows the
semi-elasticity input for horizontal distortions
(HD) — that is, the extent to which a state
corporate income tax rate induces economic
activity to move to other U.S. states and thereby
grows those other states’ tax bases at the margin.
14
As we explained in our 2017 article, we read
the empirical literature as implying that the most
plausible range of inputs for both VD and HD are
probably somewhere between 2 and 3. We thus
show results for a range of VD of between 2 and 3
(and also 1 to show the implications of what we
take to be an implausibly low-end measurement).
For the reasons we explained in our 2017 article,
we show a wider range of possible inputs for HD
(but with 0 and 8 being shown to depict the
implications of what we take to be an implausibly
low-end and an implausibly high-end input,
respectively).

13

12

A more thorough update of our prior analyses than the one we
provide here would review the recent empirical literature to update the
empirical estimates that our analyses rely on, rather than just updating
the corporate income tax rate. We hope to return to this task in future
work. But for present purposes, a thorough update of that sort is beyond
the scope of this short article.

Gamage and Shanske, “Fiscal Federalism,” supra note 1, at 323. As
in our prior article, “When the acting state’s tax rate exceeds the revenuemaximizing level for the acting state . . . marginal tax cannibalization
(MTC) becomes infinite. We thus put ‘N/A’ in those boxes to indicate
‘Not Applicable.’”; id.
14

Id. at 319-22.
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Within each box, we then show four output
estimates:
• First, “ActStRevMaxTR (%)” shows the state
corporate income tax rate that would
maximize tax revenue for the acting state’s
government. In other words, hiking the tax
rate above that level would deprive the
acting state government of revenue (this
level is sometimes referred to as the peak of
15
the Laffer curve ). Any state government
that cares about the welfare of its citizens
should thus set its corporate tax rate below
this level.
• Second, “NatRevMaxTR (%)” shows the
state tax rate that would maximize revenues
for all jurisdictions, including the acting
state, the federal government, and other
states’ governments. So long as tax
cannibalization is positive, this number will
be lower than the prior output

measurement, because positive tax
cannibalization means that the acting state’s
tax rate is on net destroying other U.S.
governments’ revenues. It is not necessarily
irrational for a state government to set its tax
rate above this level, because the state
government may not care much about the
impact of its tax policies on federal
government revenue.
• Finally, “MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of
8.84%” and “MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate
of 9.99%” show our tax cannibalization
estimates for two states: California, which
levies an 8.84 percent corporate tax rate, and
Pennsylvania, which levies a 9.99 percent
corporate tax rate.
Looking across what we take to be the most
plausible range of estimates for both VD and HD
from the prior empirical literature, (between 2 and
3 for both measurements), the table shows that we
estimate marginal tax cannibalization of between
51 cents and $1.06 for California’s corporate

15

Id. at 310.
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income tax rate, and of between 55 cents and $1.24
for Pennsylvania’s corporate income tax rate.
Put another way, in 2020, California’s
corporate income tax rate is likely destroying
somewhere in the range of 51 cents to $1.06 of net
revenues from other jurisdicitons per marginal
tax dollar raised by California. And
Pennsylvania’s corporate income tax rate is likely
destroying somewhere in the range of 55 cents to
$1.24 of net revenues from other jurisdictions per
marginal tax dollar raised by Pennsylvania.
As we explained in our 2017 article,16 the
estimates we report on the table are much higher
than the bottom-line estimates for avoidable
economic waste from tax cannibalization that we
reported earlier. The reason is that the estimates in
the table are too high, in a sense, because they do
not take into account that the states would need to
raise revenue in some other way and that other
ways of raising revenue would also cause some
economic waste. In short, raising revenue through
state sales taxes, for example, would create
incentives for business taxpayers to move their
production activities out of state, so as to reduce
their susceptibility to those sales taxes.17 But the
marginal tax cannibalization generated by
alternatives like state sales taxes is substantially
less than the marginal tax cannibalization
generated by state corporate income taxes that
piggyback on the federal corporate income tax
base. Our bottom-line estimates for the
“avoidable economic waste” from the tax
cannibalization caused by state corporate income
taxes thus approximate the extent to which state
corporate income taxes generate greater marginal
economic waste than do alternatives.
This is why our bottom-line estimates for
avoidable economic waste from tax
cannibalization is between 23 cents and 42 cents

on the margin, looking across most of the U.S.
states.18 This is in contrast to a range like 51 cents
to $1.06 resulting from considering California’s
corporate income tax alone.
In summary, although the tax cannibalization
generated by state corporate income taxes has
been substantially reduced since 2017, we still
consider our 2020 estimates to be rather large and
striking. In a forthcoming follow-up article we
will evaluate some policy implications of these
revised estimates.


18

16

Id. at 336-53.

17

State sales and use taxes typically apply to purchases of many
business inputs by corporate taxpayers, especially when these purchases
are intended for the corporate taxpayers’ use in the state.

See note 12 and accompanying text supra. Looking at California,
our bottom-line estimate for avoidable economic waste in 2020 is
between 35 cents and 41 cents per marginal dollar of revenue raised by
the corporate income tax rate. Looking at Pennsylvania, our bottom-line
estimate for avoidable economic waste in 2020 is between 40 cents and 42
cents per marginal dollar of revenue raised by the corporate income tax
rate.
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